11.05.2016.Egypt’s shift from Saudi Arabia to Russia,

Egypt’s shift from Saudi Arabia to Russia

 

 Nov 5 – 4:20 pm Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

彼得後書 3:10Chinese Union Version Modern Punctuation (Traditional) (CUVMPT)

10 但主的日子要像賊來到一樣。那日,天必大有響聲廢去,有形質的都要被烈火銷化,地和其上的物都要燒盡了。

burn up 7

耶穌,信耶穌是耶和華成肉身,為拯救罪人代死在十字架上,第叄天復活、升天; 他是人類唯一之救主,天地之主宰,獨一之真神 。信審判 信主耶穌必於世界末日,從天降臨審判萬民;義人得永生,惡人受永刑。
以賽亞書 24:13 在地上的萬民中,必像打過的橄欖樹,又像已摘的葡萄所剩無幾。賽19:1預示埃及之禍亂19 論埃及的默示。看哪,耶和華乘駕快雲,臨到埃及。信審判 信主耶穌必於世界末日,從天降臨,審判萬民;義人得永生,惡人受永刑。太8 這都是災難的起頭。24 看哪,耶和華使地空虛,變為荒涼;又翻轉大地,將居民分散。 6 地上的居民被火焚燒,剩下的人稀少

馬太福音 24Chinese Union Version Modern Punctuation (Traditional) (CUVMPT)

耶穌降臨的預兆

耶穌在橄欖山上坐著,門徒暗暗地來,說:「請告訴我們,什麼時候有這些事?你降臨和世界的末了有什麼預兆呢?」 耶穌回答說:「你們要謹慎,免得有人迷惑你們。 因為將來有好些人冒我的名來,說:『我是基督』,並且要迷惑許多人。 你們也要聽見打仗和打仗的風聲,總不要驚慌,因為這些事是必須有的,只是末期還沒有到。 民要攻打民,國要攻打國,多處必有饑荒、地震, 這都是災難的起頭

以賽亞書 17Chinese Union Version Modern Punctuation (Traditional) (CUVMPT)

預示大馬士革必被廢棄

17 大馬士革的默示。

「看哪,大馬士革已被廢棄,不再為城,必變做亂堆。 亞羅珥的城邑已被撇棄,必成為牧羊之處,羊在那裡躺臥,無人驚嚇。 以法蓮不再有保障,大馬士革不再有國權,亞蘭所剩下的必像以色列人的榮耀消滅一樣。」這是萬軍之耶和華說的

以賽亞書 19Chinese Union Version Modern Punctuation (Traditional) (CUVMPT)

預示埃及之禍亂

19 埃及的默示。

看哪,耶和華乘駕快雲,臨到埃及埃及的偶像在他面前戰兢,埃及人的心在裡面消化。 「我必激動埃及人攻擊埃及人,弟兄攻擊弟兄,鄰舍攻擊鄰舍,這城攻擊那城,這國攻擊那國 埃及人的心神必在裡面耗盡,我必敗壞他們的謀略,他們必求問偶像和念咒的、交鬼的、行巫術的。 我必將埃及人交在殘忍主的手中,強暴王必轄制他們。」這是主萬軍之耶和華說的。

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, two previously staunch allies, have recently soured. This can be attributed to Egypt’s inability to perform its role as a guarantor of regional Gulf security against growing Iranian hegemony and its desire to cultivate other, less demanding, international allies—most notably Russia.

On October 10, the Egyptian delegation at the United Nations Security Council voted in favor of a Russian resolution for a ceasefire in Aleppo that would allow Russia to continue carrying out airstrikes, a move that was publicly criticized by the Saudi delegation. Interestingly, at the same meeting the Egyptian delegation also voted for France’s opposing resolution, which adopted the Saudi position calling for a no-fly zone. This seemingly contradictory stance can be explained by Egypt’s desire to appease Saudi Arabia while still cultivating a closer relationship with Russia, whom it views as a potential and reliable international ally.

However, signs of increasing tension in Egyptian–Saudi relations were apparent even before the UN vote, indicating a deeper rift. The public fallout that followed the April 2016 decision to hand over the two Egyptian islands of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi was one example. Another was the decision by Saudi Aramco to first delay and then suspend the fuel shipments for October. Egypt receives these shipments as part of a $22 billion deal to finance its petroleum needs under favorable conditions. No reasons were given for the Saudi action, and the status of the November shipment is still unknown.

In response to Saudi Arabia’s public critique of the UN vote and the suspension of oil shipments, the pro-regime Egyptian media started a campaign against the kingdom, leaning on nationalist rhetoric of sovereignty and independence, going as far as accusing the kingdom of supporting terrorism. Khaled Salah, the editor-in-chief of Youm7, even urged Egyptians not to go to Mecca for Hajj or Umra, under the guise that it would save Egypt hard currency. This was followed by attacks on Egypt in the Saudi media, in a rare display of conflict. 

The growing rift can also be attributed to Egypt’s inability to fulfill its promises to militarily defend Gulf regional security against increased Iranian penetration in Yemen and Syria. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi made this pledge himself during his presidential campaign in 2014, when he stated that military intervention to protect the Gulf states is part of the Egyptian’s army doctrine. In a meeting with a Kuwaiti delegation in 2016, this time as president, he reiterated Egypt’s commitment to the security of the Gulf states. This did not stem from the regime’s desire to extend its influence beyond its borders. As was made clear in a leaked recording of a meeting between Sisi and other military leaders, this was instead driven by the need to ensure the continuous flow of Gulf aid, most notably from Saudi Arabia.

However, Egypt has failed to keep its side of the bargain. For example, on Syria the Egyptian position is more aligned with Moscow and Tehran than with Riyadh. Saudi Arabia announced in February 2016 that it was ready to send ground troops to Syria as part of the international coalition to fight the Islamic State, after the pro-Assad forces made a number of gains aided by the Russian airstrikes that started in September 2015. Egypt responded that the readiness to send ground troops to Syria was a sovereign Saudi decision and not applicable to the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism—a Saudi-led coalition including Egypt and 37 other countries. Egypt’s decision to publicly distance itself from the Saudi announcement reflects its recognition of the alliance’s aim of countering Iranian hegemony in Syria. Sisi further declared that Egypt backs the need for a negotiated settlement in Syria, though he did not mention whether this would involve removing Assad. In Saudi Arabia’s view, any acceptance of the Assad regime is also an acceptance of Iranian hegemony over Syria. But at the moment, for Egypt, supporting the pro-Assad Russian policy in Syria is an attempt to cultivate closer relations with Moscow. 

In the case of Yemen, where the Saudi-led coalition has been involved in a prolonged campaign, the Egyptian position is more ambiguous. However, the net result is the same, namely token participation. At the beginning of the war, Egypt sent naval and air forces to Yemen, also declaring its intention to send ground troops if needed. Even though the Egyptian National Security Council agreed in January 2016 to extend Egypt’s participation for up to one year, Egypt still has not sent any ground troops to Yemen. The Egyptian military’s participation in Yemen has been more symbolic and has not met the quality or quantity expected by the Gulf states.

Even though the Egyptian regime can scarcely afford the loss of Gulf aid, a military intervention—in which the Egyptian military would likely suffer heavy causalities—could cause a wide-scale domestic backlash. To avoid such a scenario, Egypt is seeking to cultivate Russia as an economic ally that would impose fewer military demands on Egypt. For example, Egypt has cooperated with Russia in the area of nuclear energy, where it agreed to a $25 billion Russian loan on November 19, 2015 to build a nuclear power plant. And after tensions with Saudi Arabia became public, the two countries agreed to hold joint military exercises from October 15 to 26. This has exacerbated the dissonance between Egyptian promises and actions toward the Gulf states.

Ultimately, the public fallout between the two allies was caused by Egypt’s inability to act as a guarantor of Gulf security. In light of that, Egypt is moving toward other, less demanding allies, most notably Russia. As the fragility of the Egyptian regime increases, the more likely it will drift more into the Russian orbit and seek similar reliable allies who have the added benefit of supporting its repression of domestic opponents. 

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埃及全面上调燃料价格以削减政府补贴开支

2016年11月04日 23:27:26 来源: 新华社

  新华社开罗11月4日电(记者郑凯伦)埃及政府3日晚间宣布,将于4日起全面上调燃料价格,涨幅为30.5%至46.8%。这是埃及政府继实行埃镑浮动汇率后的又一重要改革举措。

  根据埃及石油部的声明,埃及80号汽油、92号汽油、柴油和天然气每升价格分别上涨46.8%、34.6%、30.5%和45.5%。新价格将于4日零点起在全国执行。

  在4日早间召开的记者会上,埃及总理伊斯梅尔称此轮涨价为“历史性举措”,目的是削减政府承担的高额燃料补贴,以削减并优化政府开支、减少财政赤字。

  伊斯梅尔说,上调燃料价格、削减燃料补贴是政府当前经济改革计划的一部分。根据这一计划,埃及政府将把财政赤字占国内生产总值(GDP)的比例从当前的12.2%削减至10%以内。

  3日早些时候,埃及中央银行宣布允许埃镑汇率自由浮动,将埃镑对美元汇率从之前的8.8比1下调至13比1,同时宣布加息300个基点。

  今年8月,埃及政府与IMF签署了120亿美元贷款的初步协议,以帮助埃及摆脱经济困境。IMF中东与中亚地区主管马苏德·艾哈迈德曾表示,此项贷款含有附加条件,包括埃及政府降低财政赤字以及实行更为市场化的汇率机制

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埃及镑是如何一步步走向毁灭的?

2016年11月04日 10:11
来源:万得资讯

埃及政府扛不住了

其实,埃及政府也是不得已而为之。在埃及,因为外汇短缺,官方汇率和黑市一直保持着巨大的差价。在今年3月14日,埃及意外宣布,实行更为自由的汇率制度,以缓解外汇短缺压力。当日,埃及镑兑美元汇率暴跌13%,从7.73埃及镑贬值到8.85埃及镑,3月15日,黑市交易价降为1美元兑9.567埃及镑,官方汇率升至1美元兑8.95埃及镑。

但是,埃及镑和美元的汇率并没有企稳,外汇短缺依然很严重。当前"黑市"上1美元兑换的埃及镑达到16.11,而官方汇率是8.88。如果8.88的官方汇率保持,企业和个人就会想方设法通过各种渠道,去兑换便宜的美元。转手到黑市上,就是100%的利润。而埃及的外汇储备,只有可怜的165亿美元左右,根本禁不起折腾。他们通过“允许汇率自由浮动”的方式,让汇率的黑市价和官方价格对接

 

政局动荡和恐怖主义升温拖累埃及经济,本币贬值

众所周知,自2011年前总统穆巴拉克下台后,埃及政局动荡,除了资本外流,本币也大幅贬值。

几年的政治动荡和恐怖主义上升是影响埃及硬通外币的主要原因,也影响了对旅游业的投资与外商的直接投资。自"伊斯兰国"炸毁俄罗斯客机后,埃及旅游业直线下滑,2015年少收61亿美元,2016年预计会少收35亿美元。埃及的外汇储备自2011年的360亿美元至今已少了一半,2月末余额为165亿美元,约只能覆盖3个多月的进口支付。

埃及高度依赖进口商品,药品、小麦、燃料、机械组建等物品的进口已受到严重影响。随着外汇储备的下降,该国不得不为诸如小麦与药品这样的生活必需品买单。年初,几笔出口到埃及的小麦交易被暂停,因为交易商延迟收到埃及政府出具的付款担保。此外,埃及天然气控股公司因错过了与两个供应商的合约期限,交易也被取消。

为了缓解外汇短缺局面,埃及央行今天宣布“汇率自由浮动”,还宣布上调利率300个基点。该央行把隔夜利率、隔夜贷款利率以及央行操作利率分别上调至14.75%、15.75%和15.25%。声明称,贴现率也上调3个百分点,至15.25%。这些利率,足以吓坏中国投资者。

美联储加息周期临近,新兴市场货币再遭压力

美联储11月声明中宣布维持利率不变,称等待经济朝目标继续前进的“一些证据”。分析人士指出,声明中的美国通胀率回升的表述,意味着美联储在12月货币政策例会上决定加息的可能性有所加大。

去年12月美联储加息,最直观的冲击是绝大多数新兴市场货币对美元汇率走低。随着美国新一轮加息周期的到来,新兴市场货币面临着进一步贬值的危机。

至于人民币,未来对美元汇率可能会继续小幅贬值,但这种贬值是可控的。中国的外汇储备全球第一,几乎是埃及的200倍。所以,不用为人民币担心。

鲁政委表示,未来影响人民币汇率的不确定因素依然较多,但支撑人民币的各种因素更为强劲。“要知道,就连美国财政部10月发布的《国际经济和汇率政策报告》都表示,’基于经济基本面,人民币没有大幅贬值基础’。”

市场人士表示,近期中国经济数据回暖,为人民币汇率提供了一定的基本面支撑,政策层面对汇率的支撑也有重启可能性,人民币汇率大概率将在6.8附近企稳,继续调整空间有限。

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